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SUMMARY After 200 years of diplomatic relations, the time has come for 
the United States and Thailand to build upon this strong foundation and 
chart a new course for their alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. This re-
examination has hit roadblocks in recent years, as Thailand grapples with 
the effects of its ongoing coup and the role of the United States in the 
region is questioned at home and abroad. However, an opportunity has pre-
sented itself in the form of the United States’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
Strategy (FOIP). Both the United States and Thailand could capitalize on 
FOIP’s call for an updated, comprehensive strategy towards the region. 
Though still in the early stages, Thailand’s central role in the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) combined with its long history with 
the United States position it to have a strong influence on what shape FOIP 
will take and highlight its importance as an ally to the United States.
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Thailand-U.S. relations reached a significant mile-
stone in 2018 when the two countries marked 
the 200-year anniversary of diplomatic ties. Since 
Thailand became the first Asian nation to estab-
lish ties with the United States in 1818, the two 
countries’ bilateral relations have been tested 
through two centuries of global turbulence and 
change. To mark the occasion and to demonstrate 
their longstanding friendship, the two countries 
organized a series of activities and programs.
 Along with these commemorations—under 
the theme of “Great and Good Friends,” the phrase 
first used by U.S. President Abraham Lincoln in a 
letter to King Mongkut in 1862—abundant ques-
tions have been asked about the best way to pro-
mote the friendship and partnership so they remain 
relevant with mutual benefit. To add value to the 
relationship in the 21st century, Thailand and the 
United States do not have to reinvent the wheel, but 
they do need to look toward the future to reenergize 
and reengage with each other by relying on existing 
mechanisms that have proven successful. Although 
the emerging strategic environment in regional 
and international affairs remains unpredictable, 
the two countries’ bilateral ties remain ironclad.
 To move ahead in the age of the Indo-Pacific, 
the Thailand-U.S. defense alliance must reinvent 
itself with a new strategic outlook in order to 
maximize bilateral treaty commitments. In addi-
tion, as a key player in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its chair in 2019, 
Thailand can play an important role in the new 
global strategy as a balance for the great powers, 
enabling them to compete in peaceful ways while 
maintaining ASEAN centrality. With its century-
old independent and balanced diplomacy and 
network of regional and international partners, 
Thailand can also serve as a deterrent to any nation 
seeking to exercise hegemony in the region.
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Thailand-U.S. Defense Alliance during the 
Cold War
After the establishment of Thailand-U.S. diplomatic 
relations in 1818, it would take another 15 years for 
the two countries to formalize their friendship and 
begin bilateral trade with the singing of the Treaty 
of Amity and Commerce in 1833. Their relations 
progressed steadily through regular trade and dip-
lomatic contacts.  A more substantive relationship 
began in the 20th century when Thailand entered 
World War II aligned with the Axis powers. After 
their defeat, the United States played a principle 
role in saving Thailand from the being treated as 
an enemy country by recognizing the Free Thai 
Movement’s declaration of support for the Allied 
Forces. After admission to the United Nations in 
1946, Thailand continued to align itself with the 
United States in the nascent world body as well 
as adopting a pro-U.S. foreign policy to protect 
the country’s fragile international profile resulting 
from its collaboration with the Axis powers. After 
World War II, the United States unwaveringly 
backed Thailand in international arenas. With the 
emergence of the Cold War and the ideological 
competition between the United States and the 
former Soviet Union, the United States feared 
that Thailand and other countries in Southeast 
Asia could fall into the communist domain if left 
alone without security protection. As part of the 
regional strategy to contain the spread of com-
munism, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), or Manila Pact, was formed. Despite 
the dissolution of SEATO in 1977, the Manila 
Pact remains in force. As an offshoot of the pact, 
the Thanat-Rusk communiqué was signed in 1962 
to strengthen U.S. defense ties with Thailand and 
specifically to protect from the communist threat.1
With extensive airbases throughout the country, 
Thailand was used as a launching platform to attack 
communist positions in these three countries. After 
the Vietnam War and the end of the civil war in 
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Cambodia, Thailand–United States defense rela-
tions continued unabated even though they lacked 
the same urgency and strategic values that Thailand 
had previously enjoyed. The bilateral military exer-
cise Cobra Gold, which began in 1981, along with 
training programs and moderate arms procure-
ment have been pivotal linkages that have helped to 
preserve the two countries’ post-war relationship. 
The terrorist attacks in New York and on 
the Pentagon in September 2001 were another 
turning point in Thailand–United States rela-
tions as Washington refocused its strategic outlook 
toward Southeast Asia as the second front in its 
global war against terrorism. Washington also 
sought additional assistance from allies and friends, 
including searching for new partners in the global 
war. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
was one of the ASEAN leaders who successfully 
forged strong personal ties with President George 
W. Bush, which quickly led to close and deeper 
cooperation with U.S. intelligence and security 
communities. The temporary black site for deten-
tion of suspected terrorists in Udon Thani province 
in 2002 and the arrest of Riduan Isamuddin, or 
Hambali, in August 2003 were two highlights of 
the two countries’ rejuvenated friendship. Hambali 
was the head of the Jemaah Islamiyah terror group. 
He also was a mastermind behind the Bali bombing 
in October 2002. Thailand was later awarded major 
non-Nato ally status and fast-track free trade agree-
ment negotiations with the United States in 2003. 
However, the latter was aborted after two years of 
painful talks due to the rise of anti-U.S. sentiment 
over the issue of pharmaceutical patent protection.
Rebooting and Reinventing the Thailand-
United States Defense Alliance
It was not until 2012 that Thailand-U.S. ties 
received a major reboot after a decade of stalled 
relations caused by political turmoil and infighting 
in Thailand. President Barack Obama made a brief 
stopover in Bangkok in November 2012 as part 
of his ASEAN tour. Interviews with U.S. officials 
working on the two countries’ relations revealed 
that the visit was pivotal to putting Thailand on 
the radar again among U.S. policymakers. The 
two countries were able to review and strengthen 
security cooperation in the post–Cold War envi-
ronment for the first time since the Thanat-Rusk 
communiqué. Both sides realized they need to 
reinvent their security cooperation with new coop-
eration. The Joint Vision Statement on Thai-U.S. 
Defense Alliance, issued after Obama’s visit 
addressed 21st-century security challenges that the 
two countries would prioritize in four areas: (1) 
partnership for regional security in Southeast Asia; 
(2) support stability in the Asia-Pacific region and 
beyond; (3) bilateral and multilateral interoper-
ability and readiness; and (4) relationship building, 
coordination, and collaboration at all levels.2 
The new vision perceives Thailand as playing 
a central role in the U.S. security strategy in 
Southeast Asia as well as serving as the driving 
force within ASEAN amid the rise of China. 
Given Thailand’s close ties with China, Japan, and 
India, the United States expects Thailand to play 
a balancing role among the great powers with the 
ultimate objective of preventing any power from 
dominating the region. As both countries were 
looking forward earnestly to closer security coop-
eration, Thailand’s domestic developments took 
a new twist on May 22, 2014, when the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was 
toppled by a military coup. The unexpected power 
seizure immediately pushed back overall progress 
in relations between the two countries. The U.S. 
Department of State strongly condemned the 
coup and severed all assistance programs with the 
exception of the Cobra Gold and humanitarian 
and law enforcement programs. Unlike the pre-
vious coup, Washington’s reaction this time was 
substantially harsher, partly because of the Obama 
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administration’s added emphasis on promotion of 
democratic values and human rights. In addition, 
the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, which had received 
repeated assurances from the Thai military leaders 
that they would not stage a coup, was highly 
disappointed and hardened overall responses.
Despite active mutual diplomatic efforts to 
maintain the existing comfort level during the 
junta’s ruling, bilateral ties—especially personal 
ties at the top levels—failed to take off, hitting an 
all-time low in the 200-year history of Thailand-U.S. 
relations. Instead of being considered just another 
coup as in the long history of coups that marked 
brief ups and downs in its friendship with the 
United States, the latest coup turned out to be an 
aberration with far-reaching repercussions due to 
its longevity and unintended consequences. The 
previous coup, in September 2006, had lasted just 
466 days before a general election was scheduled. 
Now, the next general election has been scheduled 
on March 24, 2019, as announced by the Election 
Commission. This extended period under military 
rule has rendered quite a devastating impact on 
Thailand-U.S. relations, as Washington and the 
United States Congress were not able to soften 
the U.S. legal stand against the junta. Other great 
powers such as China, Japan, Russia, and India 
have taken advantage of the situation to forge 
closer political and security ties with Thailand.
After President Donald Trump was sworn in 
on January 20, 2017, bilateral ties took a swift turn. 
Within three months, the White House signaled 
that strengthening ties with allies and friends 
would be one of its foreign policy priorities. It was 
a dramatic departure from the Obama years, which 
prohibited all contacts at senior and middle levels 
with Thailand. As the junta entered the third year, 
the repeated pledges it has made to hold a general 
election in early 2019 have finally won support 
from Western democracies, which decided to gradu-
ally tear down the no-contact bans in place. During 
the first six months of 2017, senior U.S. officials 
from the White House and State Department took 
turns visiting Thailand to reaffirm the importance 
of Thailand-U.S. relations and discuss the process 
of normalization. At the end of March 2017, the 
White House indicated that Trump would invite 
the Thai prime minister to Washington. While 
other ASEAN leaders, including Vietnam and 
Malaysia, were the first to visit the White House 
under the new administration in June and September 
of 2017 respectively, Prime Minister Prayut’s trip 
to Washington in October 2017 provided a new 
impetus for Thailand-U.S. relations. Trump and 
Prayut were able to rejuvenate the significance of 
the 200-year-old friendship and oldest alliance in 
the region. The rather comprehensive joint state-
ment issued after his visit was designed to restore 
confidence of the Thailand-U.S. defense alliance, 
stating that the two leaders shared a vision of a 
stronger alliance for common security, a closer eco-
nomic partnership for common prosperity, and growing 
people-to-people ties. After Prayut’s visit, Thailand-U.S. 
cooperation intensified at full throttle.
Improved ties with Thailand also came at the 
time when the Trump administration upped its 
ante in the Korean Peninsula, attempting to get 
North Korea to denuclearize. As one of the ASEAN 
members that has maintained a stable but closed 
relationship with Pyongyang, Thailand together 
with other ASEAN members, including Singapore 
and Malaysia, has played a significant role in 
helping the United States to increase regional pres-
sure on North Korea over denuclearization. Due 
to its central location, Washington was targeting 
Bangkok, considered the nerve of Pyongyang’s 
underground trade and financial network in 
Southeast Asia. Thailand formerly had amicable 
relations with North Korea, with two-way trade 
amounting to US$150 million per year in the past 
five years. However, all export-import transactions 
between the two countries ended in January 2018 
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following U.S. request. Currently, taking advan-
tages of improved ties, Thailand and the United 
States are working on new frameworks of enhanced 
security cooperation that include maritime domain 
awareness; strengthening maritime security coop-
eration and various capacity-building programs 
related to logistics; military-industrial research; and 
movement coordination of aircraft, personnel, and 
cargo. Thailand views these new areas of coopera-
tion as a countervailing force against the pro-China 
stand frequently heard from the Thai military.
'Thailand in Washington': Tales of 
Disappointment and Lack of Communication
The argument has been made that Washington 
is not only the U.S. capital but is considered 
the capital of the world. What is said and dis-
cussed has implications in bilateral relations as 
well as in the global political system.3 Interviews 
and discussions with three dozen current and 
former government officials, experts, lobbyists, 
scholars, and businessmen as well as aides to U.S. 
lawmakers on the state of Thailand-U.S. rela-
tions reveal how U.S. policymakers have viewed 
Thailand.4 Although not new, all of these views 
have something unique to say about Thailand’s 
overall situation and bilateral ties in particular, 
reflecting a divergent assessment. Some opinions 
are factual while others are simply based on stereo-
types and misperceptions. The most often-heard 
remark was that Thailand has itself to blame due 
to domestic uncertainties as they are impedi-
ments to better bilateral relations in huge and 
sustained ways. Obviously, Thailand as viewed in 
Washington—the perception of U.S. lawmakers—
is different from Thailand as viewed in Thailand.
Several salient points stand out from the inter-
views. Those interviewed said that Thailand needs 
to make its presence strongly felt in Washington. 
During the eight-year period from 2004 to 2012, 
all seven Thai ambassadors failed to serve a full 
term. Short-term ambassadorial appointments in 
one of the country’s most important diplomatic 
missions reflected Bangkok’s complete lack of 
urgency to strengthen its presence and relations 
in Washington. Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia have the most versatile ambas-
sadors in place with large staffs to cover contacts 
with the movers and shakers in Washington in 
a sustainable manner. Without adequate repre-
sentation in the capital that allowed indigenous 
voices to be heard, views about Thailand were 
often channeled through the eyes and views of 
nondiplomatic sources, especially from inter-
national and civil-society organizations.
U.S. officials working for the Trump admin-
istration strongly believed that Thailand must 
improve communications with U.S. policymakers 
in the capital in a sustainable manner. In short, the 
Thai diplomatic corps must articulate Thai views 
and be able to explain them to their American 
counterparts. More importantly, they have to “walk 
the Hill” to ensure that U.S. lawmakers understand 
the local situation as the local understands it. This 
is an important measure that would place Thailand 
on their agenda. Furthermore, Thailand must 
"make itself relevant” to the U.S. global strategy, 
especially with respect to its policy in Southeast 
Asia. As a U.S. treaty ally, Thailand remains a valu-
able asset, but U.S. policymakers and Congress 
need to be constantly reminded of the country’s 
importance to the United States and how it could 
fit in the broader U.S. strategy and interest.
U.S. security experts emphasized that Thailand 
must also fulfil its security alliance commitments. 
This has been a key issue for the past seven decades. 
Truth be told, the earlier years of Thailand-U.S. 
defense cooperation were completely based on the 
fight against the spread of communism as stated 
clearly in the 1962 Thanat-Rusk joint communiqué. 
However, in the post–Cold War era Thailand’s 
security commitment as an ally has gradually 
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eroded. Meanwhile, China continues to rise and 
to expand its influence in the region. Instead of 
strengthening defense ties with the United States, 
Thai policymakers continue to befriend China. 
Ruptures in Thailand-U.S. ties due to political 
turmoil and uncertainty in Thailand also provided 
good opportunities for China to make substantial 
progress in its relations with the country. Due to 
stable Thailand-U.S. military ties, the Thanat-
Rush communiqué has remained untouched for 56 
years. Since there was no provision for review or 
monitoring, as in other U.S. treaty alliances such 
as with the Philippines or Australia, neither the 
United States nor Thailand has bothered to amend 
it. At this point in time as the international envi-
ronment becomes more fluid and unpredictable, 
it is critical that Thailand manifest some defini-
tive pathway to strengthen security cooperation 
with the United States under the Trump admin-
istration, both bilaterally and internationally.
Some U.S. officials who used to work closely 
with Thailand have lamented that current Thai 
officials do not trust their U.S. counterparts even 
though the United States saved Thailand from 
communism and other threats. They cited the 
toxic outcome of numerous coups, which have 
retarded progress on bilateral ties. Despite excel-
lent defense ties and good personal rapport among 
senior Thai and U.S. officials, for instance, the level 
of mutual trust has receded dramatically among Thai 
officials, especially in the aftermath of the May 2014 
coup. Some of Thai soldiers have expressed con-
cern over the perceived U.S. interference in Thai 
politics as a threat to their country’s security.5
After the student uprising and democratic 
transition from 1973 to 2000, bilateral ties were 
quite stable as Thailand was trying to consolidate 
its fragile democratic institutes. But this effort was 
derailed when the country was hit by the economic 
downturn leading to the Asian economic crisis 
in 1997, with serious economic repercussions in 
South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Before the 
2006 coup, the country’s 17th, Thailand enjoyed a 
15-year span of democratic rule. This period was a 
moment of glory as the country was considered a 
beacon of democracy in Southeast Asia with a free 
press and was praised for its approach to human 
rights. After all, given that Thailand transitioned 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional 
monarchy in 1932, with such a long experience one 
would hope that the country should have made 
tangible progress in establishing democratic institu-
tions. However, such was not the case, mainly due 
to internal divisions and polarization that existed 
86 years ago and continue even now in Thai society.
New Strategic Convergences: Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP)
From June 23 to Jul 10, 2018, the Indo-Pacific 
Command dispatched 42 officials to assist 
Thailand’s rescue efforts for the young football 
team trapped deep inside a cave complex in Chiang 
Rai. The rescue mission, which was also joined by 
rescuers from other countries, represented an ideal 
crisis response that brought out the best of bilat-
eral and multilateral relations between Thailand 
and the United States. It allowed Thai and U.S. 
rescue teams to plan and work together, thanks to 
decades-long joint training that helped to increase 
interoperability, both military and civilian. The 
cave rescue was a positive news story that has been 
missing from the archives of Thailand-U.S. relations 
for the past four decades since the end of Cold War.
The latest U.S. National Security Strategy 
(NSS), released in 2017, briefly mentions the 
two Southeast Asian allies, Thailand and the 
Philippines, but singles out four other ASEAN 
countries—Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore—as its growing security and economic 
partners.6 This was a wake-up call for Thailand, 
which often mistakenly perceived itself as the 
pivotal state in U.S. grand strategy due to its 
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status as a treaty ally situated in the heartland of 
Southeast Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, 
the two countries’ military ties have not been as 
close as before. The absence of strategic conver-
gence further eroded Thailand’s strategic value to 
the United States. Following Trump’s announce-
ment of the FOIP strategy in Danang, Vietnam, 
in November 2017, few details emerged from 
Washington. In April, Alex Wong, deputy assis-
tant secretary for the bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, was the 
first senior U.S. official to put meat on the bones 
of the strategy. Wong pointed out that the FOIP 
has both domestic and international dimensions. 
Domestically, the United States would like to see 
“the societies of the various Indo-Pacific countries 
to become progressively more free—free in terms of 
good governance, in terms of fundamental rights, 
in terms of transparency and anti-corruption.” 
He noted that this implies open logistics, more 
investment, and more transparent regulatory struc-
tures related to infrastructure and clarified that 
in the international realm “open and free” means 
open sea lanes of communication and open air-
ways as well as free, fair, and reciprocal trade.7 
Two months later, Defense Secretary James 
Mattis gave more details of the strategic elements 
of the FOIP.8 Mattis outlined the strategy’s four 
key elements in front of senior defense officials 
from ASEAN. First, it focuses on the maritime 
space, the so-called maritime commons. The 
United States would like to build up naval and 
law enforcement capabilities and capacities to 
improve monitoring and projection of maritime 
borders and interests. Second, it aims at increasing 
interoperability. Washington believes that a net-
work of allies and partners working together, and 
the resulting closer ties between militaries and 
economies, will contribute to enduring trust. 
Third, the strategy calls for strengthening the rule 
of law, civil society, and transparent government 
as well as promoting sustainable economic devel-
opment. Fourth, the private sector will take the 
lead in development of infrastructure. This means 
pushing development and finance institutions to 
be “better, more responsive partners” with knowl-
edge and technical transfers with end-to-end solu-
tions, without surrendering economic sovereignty. 
In a nutshell, Mattis reaffirmed the essence of 
the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy as a subset of the 
broader U.S. security strategy. “Make no mistake: 
America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our 
priority theatre,” Mattis declared. To underscore 
the importance of the new strategy, the current 
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in 
Hawaii had changed its name to the United States 
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).
At the ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting 
in Singapore in August 2018, U.S. Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo announced the alloca-
tion of US$300 million to strengthen security 
in the Indo-Pacific region, which followed hot 
on the heels of a US$113 million economic ini-
tiative announced at the end of July 2018 in 
Washington. Putting all the details together, this 
financial commitment showed Trump’s determina-
tion to push forward the Indo-Pacific strategy. 
Thailand’s Role in FOIP and the ASEAN 
Chairmanship in 2019
The United States introduced the FOIP strategy 
at the right time. Thailand has already con-
veyed its strong support, as it could usher the 
country into the center of the regional scheme of 
things.9 In coming months and years, Thailand 
would be able to take up the FOIP not only 
independently but also as part of ASEAN. 
Five reasons for this can be discerned.
First, Thailand has assumed ASEAN chair-
manship in 2019, succeeding Singapore. As of 
August 2018, ASEAN had not yet substantially 
discussed the FOIP, as its leaders still did not have 
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sufficient information about the concept and its 
operationalization plan. In November 2018 at the 
33rd ASEAN summit, the group’s leaders discussed 
the U.S. strategy but did not reach any consensus. 
The chairman's joint statement simply said that 
they look forward to discussing it further. As of 
September 2018, Jakarta had spearheaded a senior 
official meeting (SOM) among ASEAN to discuss 
the FOIP so that the bloc could form a common 
position. Vice President Mike Pence, standing 
in for Donald Trump, made a hard push for the 
Indo-Pacific strategy with ASEAN. At the summit, 
the ASEAN leaders agreed to conduct further 
study of the U.S. proposal. By the next East Asia 
Summit in November 2019, ASEAN hopes to have 
its own strategic plan for the Indo-Pacific, with a 
different name. As the incoming chair, Thailand, 
can work together with the United States to fine 
tune the FOIP. Thailand has already pledged to 
coordinate with ASEAN members to ensure that 
the ASEAN version would contain rules-based and 
norms that would strengthen the ASEAN cen-
trality as well as peace and stability in the region.
Second, Thailand is also one of five U.S. allies 
in the Indo-Pacific theatre, along with Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. While 
Washington continues to emphasize the importance 
of strategic relations with all its defense allies in the 
region, Thailand has been pushed to the back benches. 
After the end of Cold War, the Thailand-U.S. 
defense alliance did not enjoy the same strategic 
significance as before. In the post-Cold War era, 
all of the former Indochinese countries have joined 
ASEAN and have good relations with Thailand.
The FOIP is considered a new area of strategic 
convergence in which Thailand and the United 
States can work together using existing networks 
that have been established for decades. If neces-
sary, the two countries can also create new ones. 
Mattis affirmed that with the strategy in place, 
the countries in the region could work together 
to promote their economies and security while 
protecting their sovereignty and independence. 
"No one nation can or should dominate the 
Indo-Pacific," Mattis reiterated in Singapore.10
Third, Thailand is in a good position to 
promote ASEAN centrality as a partnership of 
the FOIP strategy. Since Thailand helped found 
ASEAN in 1967, its principal foreign policy tenet 
toward the bloc has never changed. Bangkok has 
long served as the cradle of ASEAN because of 
its consistency on ASEAN matters. ASEAN has 
become part of the country’s diplomatic DNA as 
well as its largest trading partner. In addition, last 
year Thailand attracted nearly 10 million tourists 
from the other nine ASEAN members, gener-
ating billions of dollars in revenue. Therefore, it is 
natural that Thailand would make every effort to 
continue to promote ASEAN centrality in every 
possible area. In Vientiane, Laos, in 2016, Thailand 
urged its ASEAN colleagues to raise the profile of 
the 40-year-old Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC), the region's first regional code of conduct. 
Now, with 37 signatories, the group’s members 
have agreed to jointly promote the TAC as an 
international code of conduct. This was part of a 
concerted effort to promote ASEAN centrality.
Fourth, Thailand can help to increase the 
interoperability between the United States and the 
rest of the ASEAN members. Since 1981, Thailand 
and the United States have jointly organized the 
region’s largest annual military exercise, Cobra 
Gold. What started out as a bilateral military affair 
37 years ago has now become a multinational mili-
tary exercise with troops from 28 countries. The 
exercise allows U.S. friends and allies to learn from 
one another how to work and plan together under a 
single command and control in a regional humani-
tarian or disaster crisis. Under the FOIP strategy, 
this interoperability should be given priority. 
Future enhanced security cooperation between 
the two countries would have positive impacts, 
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increasing interoperability within the grouping.
Fifth, Thailand has an independent foreign 
policy, which has been accepted by all neighboring 
countries and great powers. Its centuries-old bal-
anced diplomacy saved the country from colonial 
powers—making it the only country in Southeast 
Asia to avoid European colonial rule. Traditionally, 
Thailand would continue to engage great powers 
in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms to make 
sure they can coexist peacefully. With its bal-
anced and non-confrontational approach, Thailand 
remains a pillar in guaranteeing that ASEAN 
will not stray and side with any major power.
Finally, the country is gearing up to hold a 
long-awaited election in March 2019. As such, it 
will send a strong message to the international 
community that Thailand has finally returned to 
its old democratic self. Beginning in 2018, major 
Western countries, including the United States, 
the European Union, and Australia have gradu-
ally resumed bilateral engagements with Thailand. 
In July, the U.S. State Department finally recog-
nized Thailand’s four years of continued efforts to 
improve human rights and the working conditions 
of millions of migrant workers, which had previ-
ously been a bone of contention between the two 
countries. Washington upgraded Thailand to Tier 
2 in the Trafficking in Persons Report 2018.11 
Suffice it to say that with a civilian government in 
place after the March 2019, Thailand's diplomatic 
role should resume greater significance, granted 
a new set of internal and external challenges.
With its balanced 
and  nonconfron-
tational approach, 
Thailand remains 
a pillar in guaran-
teeing that ASEAN 
will not stray and 
side with any ma-
jor power
Conclusion
The FOIP strategy gives Thailand a unique oppor-
tunity to jump-start the stalled Thailand-U.S. 
defense alliance. For nearly three decades, these 
security ties have not been maximized because 
of a lack of confluence of interests. Thailand’s 
oft-maligned domestic political environment often 
adds an element of uncertainty to one of the 
most important security links the United States 
has with Southeast Asia. The current strategic 
environment has created new challenges to com-
pliance with international norms and rule of law. 
The FOIP strategy reflects Thailand’s desire to 
strengthen peace, stability, and well-being in the 
region. Further, it aims at promoting better rela-
tions and cooperation among allies and friends 
in economic, security, and social areas. Thailand, 
as a key defense ally of the United States and 
active member of ASEAN, can fulfill these dual 
roles to bridge the Indian and Pacific oceans into 
one interlinked strategic area and ensure that the 
contest among great powers for influence in the 
region would not degenerate into hegemony.
With Thailand’s return to full-fledged 
democracy and governance after a nearly five-
year lapse, its traditional role of providing a 
balance to the great powers will be revived and 
become more dynamic. Therefore, Washington 
needs to resume its regional leadership. 
As it assumes the ASEAN chairmanship, 
Thailand can help to shape the organization’s 
agenda and substance to reflect the will of the 
ASEAN Community as a whole as well as its 
comprehensive relationship with all dialogue 
partners, including supporting the FOIP.
Analysis from the East-West Center
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